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1
ASEAN Law in the New Regional Economic
Order: an Introductory Roadmap to the ASEAN
Economic Community
pasha l. hsieh and bryan mercurio
1.1 Introduction
The impasse of the WTO Doha Round has spurred the proliferation of
trade and investment agreements, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region.
The fast-growing ASEAN has been attracting the attention of govern-
ments and enterprises, increasing its importance to global value chains
and the world economy. This book explores the theoretical concept of
ASEAN law within the broadly defined discipline of international eco-
nomic law. More specifically, it sheds light on the roadmap to the AEC
Blueprint 2025 by evaluating the impact of regional agreements on the
business and commercial aspects of laws.
The evolution of ASEAN is significant for global trade. First, with
a strategic location and population of 640 million, ASEAN is a rising
trade power. The ten-country bloc is Asia’s third-largest economy, and is
expected to ascend from the world’s sixth to the fourth largest economy
by 2030.1 Owing to its geopolitical salience, ASEAN has become
a priority trade partner for China, India, the EU and the United
States. Second, the legalization of the AEC and ASEAN’s external FTAs
with major Asia-Pacific economies provides a valuable case study of
South-South regionalism between developing nations.
Finally, ASEAN’s FTA strategy plays a critical role in the development
of mega-regional trade agreements. The United States’ withdrawal from
the TPP did not deter the remaining signatories from reviving the pact.
1 ASEAN Economic Community Chartbook 2017 (2017), at 2; Victor Wong, Compelling
Case for Investing in Asean Region, The Straits Times, Feb. 4, 2018, www.straitstimes.com
/business/invest/compelling-case-for-investing-in-asean-region (last visited Jun. 29, 2018).
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The eleven-party CPTPP was signed in March 2018.2 It includes Brunei,
Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. Another major initiative, the RCEP, is
“an ASEAN-led process.”3 The sixteen-country RCEPwill encompass the
ten ASEAN Member States and incorporate the mechanisms of existing
ASEAN agreements.4
ASEAN did not begin as an economic endeavor. In fact, the inception
of ASEAN in 1967 was primarily driven by political considerations.
Pursuant to the Bangkok Declaration, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand established ASEAN as a loose secur-
ity alliance against communist expansion.5 The postcolonial mindset
energized the “ASEAN Way,” which rests upon noninterference and
consensus-based principles.6 The accession of Brunei in 1987 and the
subsequent addition of four least-developed members, Cambodia, Laos,
Myanmar and Vietnam (known as the CLMV countries), made today’s
ASEAN a ten-country bloc.7 The development gap between earlier
members and CLMV countries is often perceived to have created a two-
tiered ASEAN, and gives rise to notable special and differential treatment
provisions under ASEAN agreements.
ASEAN members signed the first economic agreement enabling pre-
ferential trading arrangements in 1977, but the objective was the promo-
tion of economic cooperation rather than economic integration.8
Preoccupied with cross-border commodity trade, the initiative was
designed to ensure a commercially viable market for large-scale indus-
trial products that selectedMember States produced. This initiative failed
to increase intra-ASEAN trade because Member States insisted upon
lengthy exclusion lists and high tariff rates. Faced with global regionalism
and the rise of China and India, ASEAN countries switched their focus to
trade liberalization and formed the ASEAN Free Trade Area in 1992.9
2 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership Ministerial
Statement, Mar. 8, 2018.
3 ASEAN Framework for Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (2011).
4 Guiding Principles andObjectives for Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (2012).
5 Rodolfo C. Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from
the Former ASEAN Secretary-General 1–11 (2006).
6 ASEAN at 50: Achievements and Challenges in Regional Integration (2017), at 3–7.
7 Walter Woon, The ASEAN Charter: A Commentary 10–12 (2016).
8 Severino, supra note 5, at 214–25.
9 Id., at 222–5; Tham Siew Yean & Sanchita Basu Das, Introduction: The ASEAN Economic
Community and Conflicting Domestic Interests, in Moving the AEC Beyond 2015:
Managing Domestic Consensus for Community-Building 1, 3–4 (Tham Siew Yean &
Sanchita Basu Das eds., 2016).
4 pasha l. hsieh and bryan mercurio
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3230488 
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/16268661/WORKINGFOLDER/MERCURIO/9781108424998C01.3D 5 [1–21] 19.1.2019 4:37PM
This initiative was not wholly successful, as insignificant margins of
preferences and complicated administrative procedures necessary to
meet the rules of origin led to the scheme’s low utilization rate by
businesses.10
In tandem with the development of the bloc was the beginning and
evolution of the concept of unified ASEAN law, which consolidates
separate ASEAN legal systems. A milestone of ASEAN is its transforma-
tion from an “association” to a “community,” which represents a higher
degree of legal integration.11 Guided by the ASEANVision 2020, ASEAN
leaders endorsed the plan for an ASEAN Community under the Bali
Concord II in 2003.12 The goal of the new institution is to establish three
mutually reinforcing pillars, including the AEC, the ASEAN Security
Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.13
The ASEAN Summit subsequently brought forward the deadline for
the Community from 2020 to 2015.
As a critical constitutional moment, the adoption of the ASEAN
Charter codified the bloc’s established practice and conferred legal per-
sonality on ASEAN “as an inter-governmental” organization.14
The ASEAN Charter thus alters the nature of the legal foundation for
the institutional structure of ASEAN. In 2007, ASEAN states approved
the AEC Blueprint 2015, which details the strategies for creating “a single
market and production base.”15 Another historical step took place
in December 2015 with the official launch of the much-anticipated
AEC. To structure the roadmap for the post-2015 vision, ASEAN leaders
adopted the new AEC Blueprint 2025, which targets the creation of “a
deeply integrated and highly cohesive ASEAN economy.”16
ASEAN law incorporates both internal and external dimensions that
mutually accelerate economic integration. The internal dimension
denotes multiple intra-ASEAN agreements, which underpin the AEC.
The external dimension includes ASEAN+1 FTAs that ASEAN as
10 See generally Bryan Mercurio, Trade Liberalisation in Asia: Why Intra-Asian Free Trade
Agreements Are Not Utilised By the Business Community, 6 (1)Asian J. WTO & Int’l
Health L. & Pol. 109, 110–36 (2011).
11 Tang Siew Mun, Is ASEAN Due for a Makeover, 39 (2)Contemporary Southeast Asia 239,
243 (2017).
12 Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration on the Roadmap for the ASEAN Community (2009–2015)
(2009).
13 Id.
14 Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (2007) (ASEAN Charter), art. 3.
15 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint (2007), paras. 4–9.
16 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025 (2015), paras. 3–7.
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a group signed with its dialogue partners. From 2002 to 2017, ASEAN
concluded FTAs with China, India, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Australia
and New Zealand.17 RCEP members also affirmed the pledge of the
negotiating partners to integrate the legal mechanism consistently with
coexisting ASEAN+1 FTAs.18 These agreements have strengthened
ASEAN centrality, a notion that the ASEAN Charter mandated to ensure
the bloc’s indispensable status in the region.19
After fifty years of ASEAN’s progress, it has become urgent and
necessary to have a comprehensive analysis of ASEAN law in national,
regional and global contexts. Built on the latest AEC Blueprint 2025, this
collection provides the most up-to-date examination of pressing legal
issues that governments and investors face with respect to access to the
ASEANmarket. Each contributor closely considers these parameters and
the operation of ASEAN law, reflecting its challenges to conventional
theories of regional integration. This book therefore provides a rare
opportunity to assess cutting-edge areas of ASEAN law not only from
the conventional trade law angle, but also from commercial law and
intellectual property perspectives.
In addition, this collection centers on the impact of the latest bilateral
FTAs and mega-regionals on national legislation vis-à-vis commercial
operations. Comparative case studies in selected countries and the imple-
mentation of recent bilateral agreements, including the China-Australia
FTA and EU FTAs with Vietnam and Singapore, enrich the understand-
ing of ASEAN law. The features highlighted in the chapters allow us to
present fresh and holistic perspectives of Asia-Pacific regionalism and
bridge the gap between theory and practice.
1.2 The Contextual Framework of the New Regional
Economic Order
As the title of the book indicates, we situate ASEAN law in the context of
the NREO and assess associated global trends and shifting paradigms.
17 ASEAN concluded the most recent ASEAN+1 FTA and investment agreement with
Hong Kong in November 2017. For the history and framework of ASEAN’s other external
trade agreements, see David Chin Soon Siong, ASEAN’s Journey towards Free Trade, in
Economic Diplomacy: Essays and Reflections by Singapore’s Negotiators 209, 217–42
(Chin Leng Lim & Margaret Liang eds., 2011).
18 Joint Leaders’ Statement on the Negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (2017), para. 5.
19 ASEAN Charter, art. 2(2)(m); Woon, supra note 7, at 71–2; Amitav Acharya, The Myth of
ASEAN Centrality?, 39 (2) Contemporary Southeast Asia 273, 274–8 (2017).
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We propose the NREO as the normative framework to understand the
contemporary dynamics of Asia-Pacific FTAs, which shape the evolution
of ASEAN law.20 The NREO represents the Global South’s prodevelop-
ment aspirations but is different from the movement of the NIEO. In the
1970s, the Group of 77 that included predominantly Asian and African
states pushed for the United Nations to adopt the NIEO principles.21 This
group resorted to the UN Conference on Trade and Development to
influence negotiations of the GATT, whichWashington and Brussels had
dominated.
In essence, the South requested a “just and equitable” economic order
that demands absolute trade sovereignty and justified exceptions to
cardinal trade norms such as the most-favored-nations principle.22
To a certain extent, the South’s agenda was advanced by prompting the
GATT’s incorporation of prodevelopment schemes, including special
and differential treatment provisions and the Enabling Clause, which
legalizes preferential market access for the South.23 However, the NIEO
quickly waned because of the divergent interests of the developing
nations and, more decisively, the Thatcher-Reagan coalition’s refusal to
consider further demands.24
Since the Uruguay Round, the Washington Consensus – based on the
North’s concept of neoliberalism – became the dominant force for the
trading system.25 Under the single undertaking approach of the WTO,
developing countries lacked bargaining power to confront the North.
They were compelled to assume daunting obligations ranging from
services to intellectual property under various agreements. Similar
20 This normative framework can be explained by realist and dependency theories. Pasha
L. Hsieh, Reassessing the Trade – Development Nexus in International Economic Law:
The Paradigm Shift in Asia-Pacific Regionalism, 37 (3) Northwestern J. Int’l L. & Bus. 321,
337–41 (2017).
21 GA Res. S-6/3201, Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order (May 1, 1974) (NIEO Declaration); The Early Days of the Group of 77, May 2014,
https://unchronicle.un.org/article/early-days-group-77 (last visited Jun. 29, 2018).
22 E.g., NIEO Declaration, supra note 21, Arts. 4 & 5; Antony Anghie, Legal Aspects of the
New International Economic Order, 6 (1) Humanity 145, 147–9 (2015).
23 Sonia Rolland, Development at the World Trade Organization 44–5 (2012); Tracey
D. Epps & Michael J. Trebilcock, Special and Differential Treatment in Agricultural
Trade, in Developing Countries in the WTO Legal System 323, 328–30
(Chantal Thomas & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009).
24 James M. Cypher, The Process of Economic Development 238 (2014); Trade and
Development Report (2014), at 67–8.
25 John Williamson, A Short History of the Washington Consensus, in The Washington
Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance 14, 16–17 (Narcís Serra &
Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2008).
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dynamics also prompted WTO-plus components to be included in FTAs
between developed and developing nations. Much to the South’s frustra-
tion, the NIEO movement failed to achieve its goals. Conceptually, the
NIEO was preoccupied with North-South clashes in trade norms,
whereas the current NREO focuses on new-generation South-South
cooperation. In practice, the NREO has forged the collective power of
developing countries through FTAs and reconstructed the neocolonial
dependency of the South on the North.
The context of global regionalism is essential for understanding
ASEAN law in the NREO. Global regionalism can be categorized
into three major waves. The first wave occurred from the 1960s to
the 1970s.26 As ASEAN’s initial preferential trade initiative illus-
trates, the prevailing import substituting policy that sought to
increase the economies of scale by allocating regional industrial
outputs largely collapsed in the developing world. The second
wave took place in the 1980s and 1990s, when the United States
and Europe galvanized the impetus for expediting regionalism.27
Notable examples include NAFTA and the transformation from
the European Single Market to the EU. The North-led bilateral
agreements also resulted in the “domino effect” that invigorated
South-based regionalism, such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area.28
The NREO emerged in what we call the “Third Regionalism,” which
refers to the third wave of global regionalism. The Third Regionalism has
coincided with the Doha Round since the 2000s and gave rise to the AEC.
The Third Regionalism encompasses distinctive characteristics. The five-
fold growth of trade pacts in the past three decades, leading to 287 FTAs
in 2018, evidences the unpresented speed of regionalism.29 South-South
FTAs (agreements between developing countries) now represent 75 per-
cent of FTAs worldwide, whereas the number of North-South FTAs
(agreements between developed and developing nations) dropped from
26 Jagdish Bhagwati, Regionalism versus Multilateralism, 15 World Eco. 535, 538–39 (1992);
World Trade Report 2011 (2011), at 52; Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier between
Regionalism and Multilateralism: A New Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 Harv. Int’l
L. J. 419, 426–57 (2001).
27 Bhagwati, supra note 26, at 540–2; World Trade Report 2011, supra note 26, at 52–3.
28 For the background, see Richard E. Baldwin,Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of
East Asian Regionalism, Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration, No. 7
(2007), at 6–7; Amitav Acharya, Foundations of Collection Action in Asia: Theory and
Practice of Regional Cooperation, ADBI Working Paper Series, No. 344 (2012), at 14.
29 Regional Trade Agreements, www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (last
visited May 2, 2018); World Trade Report 2011, supra note 26, at 55.
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60 to 25 percent.30 These developments, along with the fact that more
than half of the world’s FTAs are in the Asia-Pacific, have led to paradigm
shifts in world trade law.31
The deviation from the West-centric liberalization to multipolar trade
governance has become a reality. The economic and geopolitical changes
in the Third Regionalism have enabled the NREO to rejuvenate the
South’s efforts to alter the existing economic order. For instance, Asia’s
ascending power has contributed to the relative decline of US hegemony.
The trade prong of President Obama’s “pivot to Asia” strategy culmi-
nated in the TPP, which was perceived not only to strengthen ties with
Asian allies but also to contain a rising China. Of course, the goodwill has
been undone by soaring populist protectionism in the United States.
Current President Trump’s policies have eroded the intended strategic
goals as well as damaged the cross-Atlantic alliance on which the pre-
vious NIEO was premised.
Furthermore, as illustrated by ASEAN Member States such as
Indonesia and Vietnam, developing countries have switched their eco-
nomic priorities from import substitution to export-driven orientation.
This policy change resulted in more than 75 percent of Asian FTAs
incorporating WTO-plus components.32 To some extent, the increase
of Asia’s intraregional trade share to 57 percent has also lessoned regional
economies’ reliance on the developed markets.33 The converging policies
of Asian countries on ASEAN, including China’s much ballyhooed “One
Belt, One Road” initiative, Korea’s New Southern Policy and Taiwan’s
New Southbound Policy, ought to strengthen the NREO in the Asia-
Pacific.
The context of the NREO builds the theoretical foundation for
ASEAN’s development as an economic community. Its legal architecture
in turn provides an alternative model for the Global South. It is true that
political scientists often compare ASEAN with the European Union, but
it is an oversimplification to characterize the AEC as an incomplete
version of the EU. Some commentators similarly ignore different poli-
tical backgrounds to argue for ASEAN to follow the European model.
Despite its legalization process, the ASEANWay continues to uphold its
30 World Trade Report 2011, supra note 26, at 55–6; Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment
Report 2016 (2016), at 90.
31 Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Report 2016, supra note 30, at 88.
32 E.g., Richard Baldwin & Masahiro Kawai, Multilateralizing Asian Regionalism, ADBI
Working Paper Series, No. 431 (2013), at 8–9.
33 Asian Economic Integration 2017 (2017), at 16.
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relevance in the bloc’s operational structure. While ASEAN is an inter-
governmental organization, the EU is a supernational institution.
ASEAN’s soft law approach based on horizontal integration makes it
fundamentally different from the EU, which consolidates its members
through a hard law, top-down approach. The EU’s embedded problems
with the euro crisis and border control contributed to the discontent that
led to Brexit and populist nationalism in various European states. Hence,
what the AEC envisions is intensifying its FTA-plus arrangements rather
than pursuing the European version of a common market or customs
union.
Two areas further exemplify the legal distinctions between ASEAN
and the EU. First, EU treaties and regulations have “direct effect” to
override national legislation, but the ASEAN Charter mandates that
members “take all necessary measures” to implement ASEAN treaties.34
National constitutions of ASEAN states are unlikely to be interpreted as
granting regional agreements self-executing power.35 Second, the treaty-
making power provisions of the ASEAN Charter do not amount to the
EU concept of competences conferred by Member States. For matters
that fall with the EU’s exclusive competences, the EU alone can negotiate
and conclude international treaties that bind individual members.
Nevertheless, ASEAN’s power is severely restricted because it does not
extend to the conclusion of agreements that would create obligations on
individual states.36 The legal obligation of ASEAN Member States is
limited to the “endeavor to develop common positions and pursue joint
actions.”37 A resultant political exercise is to convene the ASEANCaucus
meetings to converge stances before negotiating trade agreements.
The practice of concluding external agreements by ten states collectively
remains unchanged.
1.3 Consolidating the ASEAN Economic Community
As an integral part of the new ASEAN Community, the AEC marks
a milestone in Asia-Pacific regionalism. The legalization of the AEC,
34 ASEAN Charter, art. 5(2).
35 See generally Diane A. Desierto, ASEAN’s Constitutionalization of International Law:
Challenges to Evolution under the New ASEAN Charter, 49 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 268,
300–03 (2010–11).
36 ASEAN Charter, art. 41(7); Rules of Procedure for Conclusion of International
Agreements by ASEAN (2011), rule 1.
37 ASEAN Charter, art. 41(4).
10 pasha l. hsieh and bryan mercurio
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3230488 
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/16268661/WORKINGFOLDER/MERCURIO/9781108424998C01.3D 11 [1–21] 19.1.2019 4:37PM
which connects ten diverse developing nations, exhibits the NREO by
providing a new model for South-South cooperation. The AEC consoli-
dates ASEAN agreements that govern trade in goods and services, invest-
ment and dispute settlement mechanisms.38 The ATIGA integrates
previous goods-related agreements that had been signed since the
1990s. The agreement aims to eliminate tariffs and nontariff measures
and improve trade facilitation measures.
Based on its incremental modality, the AFAS enabled multiple rounds
of negotiations that led to successive “packages” of services commit-
ments. Having been negotiated as separate packages, the liberalization
of air transport and financial services also forms an integral part of the
AFAS. To facilitate the flow of intraregional professional mobility, ten
states concluded the ASEAN Agreement on the Movement of Natural
Persons and mutual recognition arrangements for selected professional
services. In addition, the ACIA increases the bloc’s competitiveness to
attract FDI. Importantly, the ACIA consolidates former agreements to
streamline the schedule of reservations and accord substantive benefits
to investors. ASEAN has also developed multilayered schemes for the
resolution of trade conflicts. While state-to-state disputes fall within the
realm of the ASEAN Protocol for Enhanced Dispute Settlement
Mechanism, the ACIA enables private investors to resort to investor-
state arbitration.
Adopted in 2015, the AEC Blueprint 2025 succeeded its predecessor and
is incorporated into the guiding document, “ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead
Together,” which charts the roadmap of the ASEAN Community from
2016 to 2025.39 To better understand the AEC, we now turn to a much-
needed analysis of key differences between the AECBlueprint 2015 and the
AEC Blueprint 2025. In 2015, the implementation rate of original AEC
goals was 79.5 percent.40 On this basis, the AEC Blueprint 2025 pushes for
further liberalization to realize the ASEAN Community Vision 2025.
The new features of the Blueprint will similarly fortify the linkage between
the ASEAN architecture with domestic business and commercial laws.
Five main characteristics are found in the AEC Blueprint 2025.
The first characteristic, “A Highly Integrated and Cohesive Economy,”
comprises the most significant steps for the new phase.41 The AEC
38 For the timeline of the key agreements, see ASEAN at 50: A Historic Milestone for FDI
and MNEs in ASEAN (2017), at 8–9.
39 Kuala Lumpur Declaration on ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together (2015).
40 ASEAN at 50: Achievements and Challenges in Regional Integration, supra note 6, at 15.
41 AEC Blueprint 2025, paras. 7–24.
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Blueprint 2025 will create “a more unified market” by facilitating “the
seamless movement of goods, services, investment, capital and skilled
labour.”42 This language modifies the aspirations of the AEC Blueprint
2015 to form “a single market and production base.”43 The seamless
movement provision suggests a step further than the previous
Blueprint, which promoted the “free flow” of goods, services, investment
and skilled labor and the “freer flow” of capital.44
Given that the bloc has achieved over 98 percent of the intra-ASEAN
tariff elimination, ASEAN’s tariff liberalization demonstrates clear pro-
gress for the AEC.45 The key area for trade in goods is to strengthen the
ATIGA and to manage proliferating nontariff measures that hinder the
result of tariff liberalization. As for services trade, the target of the AEC
Blueprint 2015 is to remove substantially all restrictions for remaining
sectors was unmet. The AEC Blueprint 2025 will lower barriers to
services trade and integrates currently fragmented commitments by
enacting the ATISA. On the investment side, the ACIA will finalize the
built-in agenda for decreasing or eliminating investment restrictions.
Tellingly, the AEC Blueprint 2025 substantially expands the coverage
for financial integration. It seeks to bolster Qualified ASEAN Banks
under the ASEAN Banking Integration Framework and facilitate capital
market linkages for multi-jurisdictional equity and debt offerings.
Moreover, the completion of national single windows for trade facilita-
tion and regulatory reforms that enhance ASEAN’s participation in
global value chains illustrate the salient features of the new Blueprint.
The second characteristic of the new Blueprint, “A Competitive,
Innovative and Dynamic ASEAN,” is built on the previous Blueprint
and reiterates regional cooperation of competition policy, consumer
protection and intellectual property rights.46 The new focus on sustain-
able economic development as the growth strategy reinforces ASEAN’s
collective commitments to the UN-led 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development.47 The third characteristic, “Enhanced Connectivity and
Sectoral Cooperation,” aims to implement the Master Plan on ASEAN
42 Id., para. 7.
43 AEC Blueprint 2015, paras. 6 & 9.
44 Id., para. 9.
45 ASEAN at 50: Achievements and Challenges in Regional Integration, supra note 6, at
15–18.
46 AEC Blueprint 2025, paras. 25–44.
47 Complementarities between the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 and the United
Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: A Framework for Action (2017), at
16–17.
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Connectivity.48 In particular, the ASEAN Single Aviation Market
Implementation Framework will commence the review of aviation agree-
ments and further liberalize air transport ancillary services. More devel-
oped than in the previous Blueprint, the AEC Blueprint 2025 pledges to
promote e-commerce transactions by developing an ASEAN Agreement
on Electronic Commerce. With the EU General Data Protection
Regulation taking effect in 2018, the global community places additional
importance on privacy in digital trade. The protection of personal data is
also envisioned in the new Blueprint.
The fourth characteristic is “A Resilient, Inclusive, People-
Oriented and People-Centred ASEAN.”49 The AEC Blueprint 2015
focused on the development of small and medium enterprises,
whereas the AEC Blueprint 2025 extends the scope to cover micro
enterprises.50 Concrete steps are planned to increase the utilization
of rules of origins under FTAs and the ASEAN self-certification
scheme for exporters. Additionally, the new Initiative for ASEAN
Integration Work Plan III will narrow the regional development gap
by providing CLMV countries with additional capacity-building
assistance.
The fifth characteristic, “A Global ASEAN,” is to strengthen the
principle of ASEAN centrality by orienting the bloc as the center of
today’s hub-and-spoke trade system.51 The AEC Blueprint 2025 is far
more ambitious than its predecessor. The latest ASEAN+1 FTA was
concluded with Hong Kong in 2017. In addition to advancing the
Doha Development Agenda, ASEAN’s immediate priority is to accel-
erate RCEP negotiations and review and upgrade external FTAs.
Finally, the success of the AEC hinges on an effective implementation
mechanism. Departing from the conventional ASEAN Way, the AEC
Blueprint 2025 mandates that the ASEAN Economic Community
Council “enforce compliance of all measures.”52 The ASEAN
Secretariat is also tasked with developing an enhanced monitoring
framework.
48 AEC Blueprint 2025, paras. 45–66.
49 Id., paras. 67–78.
50 E.g., id., paras. 68–9; AEC Blueprint 2015, para. 60.
51 AEC Blueprint 2025, paras. 79–80.
52 Id., paras. 81–2.
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1.4 The Approach and Outline of the Book
Based on the AEC Blueprint 2025, this book provides the most up-to-
date and comprehensive analysis of ASEAN law in the new era of global
regionalism, including recent developments that have taken place after
the conclusion of the CPTPP. These developments have led to even more
challenges. For instance, given the differences between the AEC
Blueprint 2015 and the AEC Blueprint 2025, what are the prospects of
ASEAN integration and implications for foreign investors? To what
extent will the AEC and the new commitments within ASEAN’s agree-
ments with China and India influence the ongoing RCEP negotiations?
How should multinational corporations and small and medium-sized
enterprises effectively respond to the ASEAN architecture, particularly in
diverse emerging markets such as the Philippines and Myanmar? Such
questions have cast doubt on the conventional wisdom but have not been
systematically addressed by the international and regional economic law
literature.
In filling this gap and exploring pressing issues for academic and
professional communities, this book is divided into four main
themes: (a) ASEAN Agreements in the Global Context; (b) Services
Trade and Financial Integration; (c) Investment Liberalization and
Protection; and (d) Intellectual Property, Digital Trade and
Consumer Protection. These themes collectively examine the concept
of ASEAN law through the lens of the intersection of regional treaties
and business and commercial laws. By focusing on the cutting-edge
areas of ASEAN law, this collection distinguishes itself from the
existing books that focus primarily on the rules of law or the regional
public law framework.53 Furthermore, various chapters provide
insight into the legal regimes of ASEAN countries from comparative
law perspectives. Using case studies, we take a holistic approach to
understanding AESAN law at both national and regional levels. Built
on the legal experts’ findings, we have been able to identify actual
gaps in the regional framework and suggest potential reforms based
on best practices.
53 E.g., Imelda Deinla, The Development of the Rule of Law in ASEAN (2017); Pieter
Jan Kuijper et al., From Treaty-Making to Treaty-Breaking: Models for ASEAN
External Trade Agreements (2015); Stefano Inama & Edmund W. Sim, The Foundation
of the ASEAN Economic Community: An Institutional and Legal Profile (2015); Sanchita
Basu Das et al. eds., The ASEAN Economic Community: A Work in Progress (2013).
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1.4.1 ASEAN Agreements in the Global Context
Part 1 of the book discusses the “Global ASEAN” initiatives, since
external context provides both the fundamental rationale and environ-
ment within which ASEAN law has operated.54 The chapters center on
systemic issues of ASEAN agreements’ status vis-à-vis WTO obligations
and RCEP negotiations. In particular, these chapters unveil the imple-
mentation of upgraded agreements that will shape mega-regionals and
the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, which Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation envisioned. Following this introductory chapter, Minh Hue
Nguyen, Deborah Elms and Lavanya N in Chapter 2 assess the evolution
and regional implications of the ATIGA, which governs ASEAN’s trade
in goods. They evaluate the status of ASEAN’s tariff eliminations and
rules of origin under the ATIGA and six ASEAN+1 FTAs. These current
updates, as well as their observations of rising nontariff measures, benefit
manufacturers and exporters.
Given the rise of China and its expanded trade ties with Southeast Asia,
Heng Wang in Chapter 3 analyzes China’s FTA strategy and its flexible
approach to ASEAN. The ASEAN-China FTA is not only the first
ASEAN+1 FTA, but also China’s first FTA that has been upgraded.
The new commitments under ASEAN’s agreements with China and
Hong Kong are expected to form the benchmark for RCEP negotiations.
Of course, the enforcement of trade commitments entails a functional
dispute settlement mechanism for resolving economic conflicts.
In Chapter 4, Henry Gao analyzes systemic issues within dispute settle-
ment mechanisms under ASEAN agreements and compares them with
the system under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. While
ASEAN FTAs with China, Japan and Korea are largely consistent with
the WTO and the ASEAN Protocol for Enhanced Dispute Settlement
Mechanism, notable differences exist in panel procedures and alternative
dispute resolution clauses. The RCEP’s consolidation of these rules will
empower developing countries and ensure ASEAN centrality in Asia-
Pacific regionalism.
1.4.2 Services Trade and Financial Integration
After considering the global context surrounding and impacting ASEAN
law, in Part 2 this collection turns to services trade and financial
54 AEC Blueprint 2025, para. 79; ASEAN Economic Community 2025 Consolidated
Strategic Action Plan (2015), at 47.
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integration. These two intertwined areas are essential to both multilateral
corporations and banks. Trade in services is the backbone of trade in
goods and has been the critical driver for ASEAN’s growth. The service
sector now accounts for more than half of the bloc’s Gross Domestic
Product and FDI inflows.55 Recognizing the prominence of services
trade, ASEAN commenced negotiations under the AFAS in 1995. Ten
packages of commitments covering main service sectors, along with
separate packages for air transport and financial services, jointly form
members’ AFAS obligations.56
In Chapter 5, Bryan Mercurio provides a detailed overview of services
commitments and reviews the structure and performance of the AFAS.
Negotiating the ATISA, an integrated services agreement, is a top priority
of the AEC Blueprint 2025. He argues for the ATISA to adopt trade-
friendly principles, includingmost-favored nations and transparency. He
also identifies the loophole in the flexibility scheme and how the CPTPP
and the prospective Trade in Services Agreement may shape the ASEAN
modality for scheduling services commitments. Markedly, among the
four modes of trade in services, the movement of natural persons (Mode
4) directly enables professional mobility. In Chapter 6, Yoshifumi
Fukunaga points out that ASEAN mutual recognition arrangements are
distinct from those of the EU and the Trans-Tasman arrangement.
In particular, the ASEAN scheme focuses on recognizing professional
qualifications rather than facilitating the movement of professionals.
By evaluating existing agreements that govern engineers, nurses and
tourism professionals, this chapter offers the best practices for the AEC.
The following chapters consider cutting-edge areas of specific service
sectors. The AEC Blueprint 2025 elaborates on the roadmap to financial
integration.57 Federico Lupo-Pasini in Chapter 7 explores the challenges to
regulatory cooperation for the integration of ASEAN banks, which are not
entitled to “single passport” rights like their EU counterparts. He explains
the rationale for bilateral agreements that enable Qualified ASEAN Banks
under the regional framework. By conceptualizing ASEAN’s banking
trilemma, he finds it difficult to simultaneously achieve the goals of
financial sovereignty, financial stability and banking integration.
Chapter 8 authored by Michelle Dy emphasizes a closely related issue of
55 ASEAN Services Report 2017: The Evolving Landscape (2017), at 6, 16.
56 Id., at 25–9; Chairman’s Statement of the Thirty Second ASEAN Summit, Apr. 28, 2018,
para. 12.
57 AEC Blueprint 2025, paras. 16–17; ASEAN at 50: Achievements and Challenges in
Regional Integration, supra note 6, at 30–3.
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financial inclusion, which energizes inclusive growth by allowing smaller-
scale enterprises to raise financing in the capital market. In her chapter, she
analyzes the impact of the Asian financial crisis and the ASEAN Capital
Markets Forum Action Plan 2016–2020 on regulatory reforms.
A comparison between the approaches adopted by the Philippine
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Indonesian Financial
Services Authority unveils different paths to capital market integration.
With international and ASEAN-based law firms expanding operations
in the Asia-Pacific, Pasha L. Hsieh in Chapter 9 sheds light on the
liberalization of transnational legal services. He examines the WTO
concept of legal services and the business impact of legal provisions
under the CPTPP, the Korea-US FTA and China’s FTAs with Australia
and Korea. Based on AFAS legal services commitments, he also deciphers
new regulatory regimes in Singapore and Malaysia and law firms’ corre-
sponding structural changes. Moreover, as the world’s only aviation
market to possess as many aircraft on order as it has in its current
operative fleet, ASEAN’s budget carriers and national airlines such as
Thai Airways and Garuda Indonesia substantially contribute to the flow
of regional passengers.58 To be better aware of the directions of the
ASEAN Single Aviation Market, Jae Woon Lee in Chapter 10 explores
current air transport and open skies agreements. This chapter also
explains the commercial practice of joint venture airlines and ASEAN’s
remaining infrastructure and regulatory challenges.
1.4.3 Investment Liberalization and Protection
Due to its rapid growth and emerging markets, the ASEAN bloc has been
an attractive investment magnet. One of the important economic ratio-
nales for forging an economic community is to ensure the bloc’s compe-
titiveness in attracting FDI. In the past two decades, ASEAN’s FDI
inflows have increased over six-fold, and the value of FDI now accounts
for 21 percent of FDI stock in all developing nations.59 Excluding intra-
ASEAN trade, the top sources of investments come from the EU, Japan,
the United States and China.60 As FDI is a critical tool for development,
the AEC Blueprint 2025 stresses improving the investment environment.
58 Investing in ASEAN 2018–2019 (2018), at 88–9.
59 ASEAN at 50: A Historic Milestone for FDI andMNEs in ASEAN, supra note 38, at xiii &
6–7.
60 ASEAN Investment Report 2017: Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Zones in
ASEAN (2017), at 4.
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In the first chapter of Part 3, devoted to investment, Sufian Jusoh
discusses the evolution of the ACIA as the central pillar that guides intra-
ASEAN investment and examines the scope of national treatment and
most-favored-nations provisions under the agreement. In addition, this
chapter illustrates the ACIA’s impact on domestic legislation by compar-
ing investment law reforms in Laos and Myanmar. Notwithstanding
different results, the two least-developed nations offer valuable lessons
for ASEAN’s investment policy and South-South FTAs. To complement
the analysis of investment liberalization, Julien Chaisse in Chapter 12
emphasizes the investment protection that the ACIA accords to ASEAN
investors. In particular, he explains key provisions on fair and equitable
treatment, the prohibition of direct and indirect expropriation and the
free transfer of funds. The role of the ATIGA and the AFAS in strength-
ening the investment environment is also examined in detail.
To enforce rights under investment agreements, ISDS is commonly
included in bilateral investment treaties and FTAs, and entitles foreign
investors to bring complaints against host governments before interna-
tional panels.61 However, such mechanism has attracted public criticism
and has become themain source of global protectionism. ISDS is perceived
as bypassing domestic courts’ jurisdiction and as creating a “regulatory
chill” that makes public policies vulnerable for multinational corporations’
legal challenges. Reflecting these concerns, the CPTPP narrows the scope
of ISDS under the original TPP by disallowing an investor to sue a host
government on the basis of the investment agreement and by suspending
the minimum standard of treatment pertinent to financial services.62
The EU’s new policy to replace ISDS with an investment court system
further complicates the debates.63 The new system, which creates
a permanent tribunal including an appellate mechanism for investor-
state disputes, has been incorporated into EU agreements with Canada,
Vietnam, Singapore and Japan.64 Trinh Hai Yen in Chapter 13 observes
61 See generally Special Issue: International Investment Arbitration in Southeast Asia, in 18
J. World Invest. & Trade 767, 767–1061 (Luke Nottage & Sakda Thanitcul eds., 2017).
62 The Annex attached to the preamble to the CPTPP suspended certain Trans-Pacific
Partnership provisions in Chapter 9 (Investment) and Chapter 11 (Financial Services);
see also CPTPP: The Five Countries that Won’t Sue NZ, According to the Government,
Newshub, Mar. 9, 2018, www.newshub.co.nz/home/politics/2018/03/cptpp-the-five
-countries-that-won-t-sue-nz-according-to-the-government.html (last visited Jun. 29,
2018).
63 See generally State of the Union 2017: A Multilateral Investment Court (2017).
64 The text of the EU-Singapore FTA was renegotiated following the 2017 judgment of the
Court of Justice of the EU on the scope of the EU’s competences in concluding trade
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the fragmented nature of ISDS mechanisms by examining the legal
designs under the ACIA and ASEAN’s external investment treaties. She
also focuses on the investment court system in the EU-Vietnam FTA and
compares it with the WTO mechanism. Her findings suggest that the
drawbacks of the EU initiative could result in an inflexibility of the court
structure and confusing jurisdiction of the appeal tribunal.
In Chapter 14, YipMan offers her insight into prodevelopment dispute
resolution mechanisms for commercial and investment disputes.65
Going beyond the ACIA, she addresses the practical need for small and
medium-size investors to solve business disputes in a cost-efficient man-
ner. She thus provides a comparative analysis of arbitration and media-
tion mechanisms in Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore, including the
innovative hybrid structure of the Singapore International Commercial
Court. Similarly underscoring the development dimension, Nimnual
Piewthongngam in Chapter 15 considers the role of CLMV countries in
realizing the AEC’s target as a single investment destination. Using the
case study of Myanmar, she examines Aung San Suu Kyi’s legal reforms
in key areas covering investment law, telecommunications law and rules
governing special economic zones. These first-hand observations offer an
assessment of the actual correlation between the ASEAN framework and
domestic legislation pertinent to investment.
1.4.4 Intellectual Property, Digital Trade and Consumer
Protection
Part 4 of the book centers on the core elements that contribute to
ASEAN’s competitiveness, productivity and its participation in global
value chains, as highlighted in the AEC Blueprint 2025. This part
addresses regional and national frameworks on intellectual property
rights, e-commerce and product safety standards. It also proposes best
practices for realizing legal harmonization based on ASEAN’s horizontal
integration model. In Chapter 16, Irene Calboli investigates the relation-
ship between intellectual property rights and the principle of free move-
ment of goods in intra-ASEAN trade. In particular, she addresses
agreements. Released in Apr. 2018, the provisions on the international investment court
are included in Chapter 3 (Dispute Settlement) of the EU-Singapore Investment
Protection Agreement.
65 For a review of ASEAN’s present dispute settlement barriers, see Locknie Hsu et al.,
Improving Connectivity between ASEAN’s Legal Systems to Address Commercial Issues
(2018), at 102–11.
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domestic laws on trademark, copyright and patent exhaustion in ASEAN
states such as Brunei, Cambodia and Malaysia and their impact on the
regional flow of commercial goods. After finding the divergences among
states and even in a single state’s treatment of different types of intellec-
tual property, this chapter provides NAFTA and EU experiences for the
AEC’s reference.
Significantly, with the escalating middle class and the prevalence of
mobile phone use, ASEAN is now the world’s fastest-growing Internet
region.66 By 2025, the population having Internet access in this region
will triple to 600 million and e-commerce sales will soar to $88 billion.67
The AEC Blueprint 2025 notes the indispensable roles of information
and communications technology and e-commerce in accelerating trade
and investment.68 To assess the roadmap, Chapter 17 authored by Eliza
Mik examines legal and regulatory challenges to facilitate e-commerce in
ASEAN. More specifically, she offers insight into the impact of the
UNCITRALModel Law on Electronic Commerce on national legislation.
Critical to commercial transactions, this chapter also investigates legal
issues of electronic signatures, consumer protection and privacy rights.
In Chapter 18, Han-Wei Liu explores an intertwined topic on data
localization, which has given rise to digital trade debates for the TPP and
other FTAs. He considers various types of data storage requirements and
data transfer restrictions, exemplified by the EU’s General Data
Protection Regulation. By deciphering recent personal data protection
or privacy acts enacted in countries such as Indonesia and Singapore, he
offers suggestions for ASEAN’s enhanced connectivity. Furthermore,
Luke Nottage and Jeannie Paterson in Chapter 19 evaluate ASEAN
countries’ consumer protection regimes in light of the AEC Blueprint
2025 and EU and East Asian jurisdictions. They find the harmonization
of ASEAN consumer protection laws problematic. To substantiate their
position, this chapter identifies the limited scope and enforcement weak-
nesses of ASEAN regulations on product safety and liability, as well as
consumer protection laws.
Chapter 20 concludes the collection. ASEAN as a bloc for developing
nations has transformed and progressed dramatically since its inception
66 e-Conomy SEA Spotlight 2017: Unprecedented Growth for Southeast Asia’s $50B
Internet Economy (2017), at 3.
67 Id., at 5; Jonathan Camhi, Southeast Asia’s Set for Explosive e-Commerce Growth, Bus.
Insider, May 16, 2017, www.businessinsider.com/southeast-asias-set-for-explosive
-e-commerce-growth-2017–5 (last visited Jun. 29, 2018).
68 AEC Blueprint 2025, paras. 50–3.
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in 1967. A sound legal architecture for implementing the AEC Blueprint
2025 is essential for consolidating the new economic community. Built
on experts’ findings of key issues at regional and national levels, we offer
concise yet concrete legal and policy advice for ASEAN enterprises and
governments. We hope these recommendations will contextualize
ASEAN law in the new regional economic order and make ASEAN
a unique model for the Global South.
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